He should forget his fantasies of a neat, happy war and forge workable
policies.
By Andrew J. Bacevich
February 19, 2004
In "Present
at the Creation," his classic account of American statecraft, Dean Acheson
reflects on the gap between illusion and policy. On the one hand, there are the
grand expectations of the visionary: eternal peace, universal freedom, a world
respecting basic human rights. On the other, there are the complexities of
history, the stubborn imperfections of mankind and the hard facts of power and
its limits.
The Bush administration — and like it or not the United
States as a whole — is suspended somewhere between these two poles.
In
Iraq, the administration grapples with the perplexing, prosaic aftermath of an
ostensibly historic victory that has produced not peace but more war. Adding the
unfinished business of Afghanistan to the mix, the price tag comes to a reported
$5 billion permonth.American casualties
continue to mount, and U.S. forces are stretched to the breaking point.
Signs of progress — such as the welcome capture of Saddam Hussein — are
offset by almost daily reminders that the occupiers are unable to meet even
their most basic obligation, namely, to protect the Iraqi people from a campaign
of terror brought on by U.S. actions. As never before, the world views the
United States with suspicion and mistrust.
Having gotten itself into a
mess, the Bush administration has responded pragmatically. It has lowered
expectations, accelerated its timetable for restoring Iraqi sovereignty and
backed away from the strident our-way-or-the-highway attitude that prevailed
through the first half of 2003. Militarily, it has sought to reduce the exposure
of U.S. forces, wherever possible putting an Iraqi face on the occupation. With
its newly unveiled initiative for nurturing liberal tendencies in the Middle
East, it has seemingly abandoned the notion that the most efficacious instrument
for promoting political change is the point of a bayonet. It has sought to mend
diplomatic fences.
This is all to the good and suggests that the myths
conjured up a year ago to jolly Americans into endorsing a preventive war —
chief among those myths the cakewalk theory and its corollary, the self-funding
occupation — are at last giving way to an approach grounded in realism. Such
realism may yet enable President Bush to extract some semblance of lemonade from
the lemon that one year ago he was so eager to acquire.
But as the Bush
administration finally gets around to forging a policy, it is essential to drive
a stake through the preposterous illusions that got us here in the first
place.
First, the illusion that the "end of history" is at hand, needing
only a gentle nudge from the United States to bring humankind to its prescribed
destination, to wit, a world that adheres to the norms of American-style
democratic capitalism. Events in Iraq provide daily reminders that history still
has mysteries and surprises to spare. The expectations of our own ideologues
notwithstanding, the world is not eager to remake itself in America's own image.
Nor should it be.
Second, the illusion that wherever the U.S. leads,
others will be quick to follow. The Iraq misadventure demolished that notion and
left the U.S. not only isolated but viewed in some quarters as a bigger problem
than Saddam Hussein's Iraq ever was. No doubt, in some sense, the world needs
the U.S. to exercise global leadership, but in an equally real sense, to lead
effectively the U.S. needs the active support of allies.
Third, the
illusion that in an information age, military power, at least as employed by
Washington, has become something of an all-purpose problem solver. Iraq has
amply demonstrated the limits of "shock and awe."
Fourth, the illusion
that the world's sole superpower has reserves of power to spare. It doesn't, not
militarily, not financially and not morally. Iraq has shown how narrow the
margin is between global hegemony and imperial overstretch. Notably, the cause
of Iraqi liberation has not evoked any discernible American enthusiasm for
coughing up more tax dollars or more recruits. We want to win. But don't expect
us to sacrifice.
It is too much to expect Bush to openly renounce these
illusions. But he would do well to let Americans know, even if indirectly, that
he has learned his lessons. Otherwise Americans might do well to choose as
president someone who will not oblige the rest of us to foot the bill for his
continuing education.
Andrew J. Bacevich, a professor of international relations at Boston University,
is currently a fellow at the American Academy in Berlin.
