Sense of Urgency at U.N. Over Nuclear Trade
Its watchdog agency is developing new ways to thwart
a black market in weapons technology. The U.S. pushes to give monitors a
larger role.
By Doug Frantz and Sonni Efron
Times Staff Writers
June 26, 2005
VIENNA — Concerned that efforts to halt nuclear proliferation have
proved inadequate, the international community is developing new strategies
to fight the illicit spread of atomic weapons technology by private smuggling
networks.
Based on lessons from the investigation of the global black market in nuclear
technology headed by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Bush administration
is pushing for a larger role for the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency.
It is also lobbying other nations to beef up export controls and is seeking
to expand international cooperation on impeding nuclear contraband.
The Khan network began to unravel after an intelligence tip led to the
seizure of a shipload of nuclear equipment bound for Libya in October 2003.
Investigators later found evidence that the network had sold designs and
material for a complete enrichment plant and atomic warhead to Libya as
well as nuclear technology to Iran.
The two countries operated ambitious clandestine nuclear programs for many
years without detection through international safeguards and export controls.
Along with improving safeguards and monitoring, top counter-proliferation
officials are focused on establishing new measures to combat what they warn
is the increasing threat of nuclear terrorism.
The Khan network demonstrated for the first time that a country can bypass
long-term investments in research and international red tape by secretly
purchasing proven nuclear technology and weapons designs from businessmen
and rogue government officials.
Robert Joseph, the new undersecretary of State for arms control, said in
Washington that the major elements of the Khan network have been "put out
of business."
Khan is under house arrest in Pakistan and several other people suspected
of involvement in his smuggling ring are in jail in other countries.
But Joseph said the U.S. is now pursuing other networks that traffic in
nuclear technology, though he said none is believed to be as extensive as
the one-stop shopping offered by the Khan ring.
Under prodding from the Bush administration this month, the U.N.'s International
Atomic Energy Agency set up a committee to study ways to strengthen its system
of preventing the illicit spread of nuclear weapons technology.
"It is time to revisit the whole safeguards system to see whether it is
still effective to meet emerging challenges," Mohamed ElBaradei, director
general of the IAEA, told the organization's board in Vienna after it approved
the committee.
Topics under consideration include efforts to encourage more nations to
share intelligence and other information with the IAEA and giving the agency
the authority to gather its own data on a wider range of exports with potential
nuclear uses.
The committee will spend the next two years studying these issues before
reporting to the IAEA board, which will determine whether to expand the
agency's authority.
The IAEA began revamping its safeguards and monitoring systems after the
reach of Khan's trafficking network was discovered. A major focus for the
agency is expanding its ability to collect and analyze public information
and coordinate intelligence received from the U.S. and other countries.
The agency is spending $1 million a year buying satellite images for a
new six-person analysis unit. In addition, it set up a system late last year
to gather information about which nations are trying to buy technology that
could be used in a nuclear program.
"We need to get all the support possible from member states in terms of
information sharing, particularly related to procurement activities," said
Mark Gwozdecky, the agency's chief spokesman.
The U.S. has regularly shared intelligence and satellite imagery with the
agency, but IAEA officials said cooperation cooled in 2003 after ElBaradei
contradicted Bush administration statements about weapons of mass destruction
in Iraq and later the agency refused to recommend referring Iran to the U.N.
Security Council after the discovery of its hidden nuclear facilities.
Relations have improved in recent weeks and the U.S. approved granting
ElBaradei a third term as director general this month.
The IAEA is not an enforcement agency and it does not have investigative
or law enforcement powers. It depends on voluntary cooperation from countries
that agree to strict monitoring of their nuclear facilities in exchange
for receiving nuclear technology for civilian uses.
An additional protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty expanded
the agency's ability to conduct inspections at facilities suspected of involvement
in nuclear activities, but not all countries have ratified the agreement.
In the U.S., the Senate approved the additional protocol in March 2004.
A State Department official said the administration hoped that Congress would
approve legislation implementing the requirements of the protocol this summer.
The Bush administration wants to make the additional protocol a standard
that must be met before nuclear technology for civilian purposes is supplied
to any country.
The administration also wants to strengthen the safeguards and improve
the IAEA's ability to verify that countries are complying with their agreements,
but the agency has its eye on steps that go beyond those envisioned by Washington.
The most far-reaching and controversial proposal is the possible expansion
of IAEA authority so it can look into the acquisition of technology that could
be used to develop nuclear weapons in violation of the nonproliferation treaty.
ElBaradei broached the idea gingerly at a closed session of the 35-member
board last week, but he quickly ran into opposition from countries worried
that the agency might become too intrusive, according to European and U.S.
officials who attended the meeting.
Some in the Bush administration are reluctant to provide the IAEA with
the authority to look into weapons programs, partly because it could conflict
with U.S. laws that protect American nuclear arms.
"Right now, different people have different views and it hasn't come down
to a formal administration decision," said a State Department official,
who asked to remain anonymous. "It is very fluid."
Some in Washington also fear that giving the IAEA authority to investigate
weapons activities would require expanding the expertise of scientists and
technicians from around the world employed by the Austria-based agency.
Only a few people now at the agency have weapons proficiency; they are
from the five countries declared to have nuclear weapons under the nonproliferation
treaty — the U.S., Russia, Britain, France and China.
"A building in Vienna with a lot of people who are acquiring knowledge
or expertise in nuclear weapons represents a proliferation risk," said a
Western diplomat who works at the agency. "People sign confidentiality agreements
to come to work here, but that probably would not be sufficient for the U.S.
and others."
Still, there is a broad consensus that new steps are required to meet the
challenge represented by organizations like the Khan network, which disproved
previous ideas about the path to possessing nuclear weapons technology.
Instead of developing its own technology slowly through assistance from
other countries and the black market, Libya was able to purchase complete
production facilities and training from the Khan ring.
Among the items uncovered by IAEA inspectors when they dismantled Libya's
nuclear program last year was a computer disk containing a video. On it were
a description of Khan's centrifuge lab in Pakistan and an offer to train technicians.
Existing nonproliferation and export controls were established chiefly
to block advanced countries from transferring nuclear weapons technology
to less developed countries, a sort of dividing line between First and Third
World nations.
The Khan network avoided the control system altogether. It provided technology
and expertise to Iran (which says its pursuit of nuclear power is for peaceful
purposes) and Libya from private suppliers and middlemen in a range of countries,
including Germany, Switzerland, Pakistan and Malaysia.
"A.Q. Khan is a demonstration of how to bypass existing controls," said
Chaim Braun, a fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security
and Cooperation. "They could do everything by themselves."
The revelations about the scope and stealth of Khan's operation, which
also is suspected of helping North Korea, has heightened global concerns
about the possibility of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands
of terrorists.
Sen. Richard G. Lugar, the Indiana Republican who heads the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, released a survey this month of 85 experts who evaluated
the dangers of attacks using nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
The nonproliferation and international security experts estimated there
is a 27% risk of an attack using a radioactive device somewhere in the world
within the next five years and a 40% risk within the next 10 years.
The Lugar report also said there was "broad agreement within the group
that nuclear weapons will proliferate to new countries in the coming years."
And a majority predicted that two to five additional countries would acquire
nuclear weapons within the next decade.
Along with strengthening the IAEA, the Bush administration wants to combat
nuclear trafficking by expanding its Proliferation Security Agreement, an
informal pact among about 60 countries to impede and stop shipments of weapons
of mass destruction headed for what the U.S. calls "states of concern." Among
the nations seen as states of concern are Iran, Syria and North Korea.
This month, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said the program had stopped
11 shipments in the last two years, including material headed for Iran's ballistic
missile program.
Joseph, the undersecretary of State, said Thursday that "nothing radioactive"
had been seized, but he declined to provide details of what was confiscated.
The program's biggest success occurred on Oct. 4, 2003, when Italian and
U.S. authorities diverted a German freighter in the Mediterranean to an Italian
port. Inside, they found five crates of nuclear components manufactured by
the Khan ring in Malaysia and bound for Libya.
Frantz reported from Vienna and Efron from Washington.
