Global Nuclear Inquiry Stalls
Authorities fear that
the extent of a Pakistani scientist's proliferation ring remains
unknown and that it will resume work if pressures ease.
By William C. Rempel and Douglas Frantz
Times Staff Writers
December 5, 2004
VIENNA — The global investigation into Abdul Qadeer Khan's black market
trade in nuclear technology has stalled in a clash of national
interests that threatens a full accounting of his secret partners and
clients, according to interviews with diplomats and officials from
several countries.
International authorities fear the full scope of the Pakistani
scientist's ring may never be known.
Senior investigators said they were especially worried that
dangerous elements of the illicit network of manufacturers and
suppliers would remain undetected and capable of resuming operations
once international pressures eased.
Investigators also said that records obtained in Libya and
elsewhere showed that some nuclear equipment purchased or manufactured
by the network had yet to be found, raising the possibility that it was
diverted to still unidentified customers.
"We are far from knowing everything," a senior European diplomat
involved in the inquiry said. "I'm frustrated by the lack of
cooperation. We are losing a lot of time."
Some countries have refused to help, and others have only
partially cooperated, said numerous officials involved in the inquiry
spearheaded by the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency,
or IAEA.
Pakistan has not permitted investigators to interview Khan, and
his closest confidant is being held in Malaysia under that country's
restrictive security act. Investigators also are concerned about the
level of cooperation of former Soviet republics and China.
Investigators have suffered setbacks and delays even as they have
gathered new evidence of the network's sophistication and have
documented its move into Dubai, an ancient smuggling port on the
Persian Gulf. Dubai was the hub of Khan's covert distribution
operation, a transportation and storage base for parts and machinery
destined for the secret nuclear programs in Iran and Libya, shipping
records and investigation files show.
The Khan ring used nondescript warehouses scattered throughout
Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, to store and repackage some of the
equipment, as well as to complete small-scale manufacturing
assignments, according to documents and photos shown to The Times.
Inspectors from the IAEA visited the warehouses in recent weeks
and took environmental samples to check for the presence of enriched
uranium, which could indicate the shipment of weapons material. Test
results are pending, officials said.
Information implicating members of Khan's ring began to surface
last December after Libyan leader Moammar Kadafi announced that he was
giving up his efforts to build an atomic bomb. In a deal negotiated
with the U.S. and Britain, Libya turned over evidence showing that Khan
and his associates had sold at least $100 million worth of technology
to Libya, including a nearly completed uranium enrichment plant to
produce material for a bomb.
The disclosures revealed that Khan, regarded as the father of
Pakistan's atomic bomb, also had provided extensive assistance to
Iran's nuclear program, dating back to the late 1980s.
Investigators from the IAEA and various police agencies have been
trying to piece together the ring's operation, identifying middlemen
and suppliers who contributed to what officials call the world's worst
case of nuclear proliferation.
Individual countries are conducting their own criminal
investigations, but the IAEA has sole responsibility for carrying out
the worldwide effort to shut down the black market.
A handful of arrests have been made in Germany, Switzerland and
South Africa. Law enforcement authorities also are investigating people
in several other countries, including Britain, France and Spain.
Not everyone is eager for full disclosure, however.
Amid speculation that Khan may have operated with the knowledge or
assistance of other high-ranking military officials in Pakistan,
President Pervez Musharraf pardoned Khan early this year and has
refused to permit investigators from the IAEA or the United States to
interview the scientist.
"Investigators are very keen to get direct access to [Khan], but I
don't think it will ever happen," a Western diplomat said.
Similarly, Malaysia has blocked access to Khan's confidant, Dubai
businessman Buhary Syed abu Tahir, who is being held in Kuala Lumpur.
Hussein Haniff, Malaysia's ambassador to the IAEA in Vienna, said Tahir
was being held under the country's Internal Security Act, which
restricts access to him.
The case is politically sensitive in Malaysia. Tahir, who married
into a prominent Malaysian family, had arranged for production of
centrifuge components at a factory controlled by the prime minister's
son.
*
Risks From Delays
Such delays and obstacles compound fears of the IAEA inspectors
that evidence will disappear, memories will fade and leads will turn
out to be false. The agency, which is responsible for monitoring
compliance with nuclear regulations, lacks the power to compel
testimony or subpoena evidence.
"Without state cooperation we have a difficult time. The whole process
is so slow," said another senior European diplomat.
Ineffective export controls also appear to be a continuing
problem, the investigation has found. Shipments of sensitive material
from Malaysia, Dubai, Spain, Turkey and Pakistan have turned up in
Libya.
Two officials said they were especially concerned about former
Soviet republics and China, which provided assistance to Iran's nuclear
program.
The Western diplomat said investigators wanted to question South
African officials after The Times reported last week that a complete,
ready-for-assembly control system for a Libyan uranium enrichment plant
was built undetected near Johannesburg, in part with imported supplies.
He questioned whether the Pretoria government should have known more
and shared more information about suspicious imports and exports.
But the diplomat said evidence in the Khan case indicated that the
problem was much more widespread.
"Some countries say their own customs people wouldn't know a
centrifuge rotor from a banana," the Western diplomat said. "The fact
that this [black market] trade could have gone undetected in some
countries raises doubts about whether it would be noticed next time."
Investigators are uncovering ever more alarming evidence about the
reach and sophistication of the Khan network in selling nuclear
equipment and knowledge to Iran and Libya over a 15-year period.
A senior investigator said that he was stunned this year when he
visited the workshop set up in Libya to manufacture components for the
uranium enrichment plant.
"These guys were really organized," said the investigator, who has
a long involvement with the nuclear industry and provided a detailed
description of the operation.
*
Machine Shop 1001
The enrichment plant was based on designs provided by Khan. It
involved using the centrifuges, an array of spinning cylinders, to
purify a uranium gas to produce enriched material for a bomb. Nearly
100 different pieces of machinery from all over the world had been
assembled before the scheme was uncovered in late 2003.
Among the machinery were two specialized lathes from Spain, a
furnace from Italy, power supply units from Turkey and centrifuge
components from Malaysia and Pakistan, the investigator said.
The Libyan plant was code-named Project Machine Shop 1001. Crates
shipped to the project used false export documents to disguise the
contents, but each was stamped with a tracking number to indicate where
in the assembly process the contents were intended.
The operating instructions were drawn from videos of Khan's
top-secret, government-owned enrichment plant in Pakistan, designs from
that plant and instructions assembled by network participants in Dubai,
according to documents and investigators.
Detailed instructions discovered in Libya specified the number of
minutes required for each step in the enrichment process and the number
of skilled technicians needed at each station in the plant.
Collections of photographs uncovered by investigators provided a
surprisingly extensive inventory of machinery that had been shipped to
Libya. Because export records and bills of lading routinely were
falsified, photos were used as proof to guarantee final payments after
delivery.
"They didn't trust each other and they didn't have proper
documentation, so they took pictures to prove what they had sent," the
senior investigator said.
Using shipping records and information from Libyan officials,
investigators determined that much of the machinery had been shipped to
Dubai. Once there, it was repackaged for shipment to Libya.
Some components were sent separately, according to investigators and
documents.
For instance, two specialized lathes were purchased from a Spanish
company without the computerized controls necessary to make precision
centrifuge parts. Such computers would have alerted Spanish authorities.
Photos of the machinery shown to The Times indicate that computer
controls were purchased separately and attached to the lathes in South
Africa and Libya.
Tahir told Malaysian police that in late 1994 or early 1995 he
delivered two suitcases containing about $3 million in cash to a Dubai
apartment used by Khan.
The money was payment for two containers of centrifuge components
sold to Iran. Investigators said far larger sums were sent to bank
accounts in Dubai, Switzerland and other countries.
Investigators said that they believed other sensitive components
of the Libyan enrichment plant had been manufactured, and that they
were urgently trying to find them.
"Big quantities did not end up in Libya, and the question is, where are
they?" said the senior investigator.
