We Aren't Fighting to Win Anymore
U.S. troops in Iraq are only trying to buy time.
By Andrew J. Bacevich
Andrew J. Bacevich is professor of international relations at Boston
University and author of "The New American Militarism: How Americans
Are Seduced by War" (Oxford University Press, 2005).
February 20, 2005
Americans of a certain age will recall Douglas MacArthur's pithy
aphorism: "There is no substitute for victory." The remark captures an
essential element of our military tradition. When the United States
goes to war, it fights to win, to force the enemy to do our will. To
sacrifice our soldiers' lives for anything less — as MacArthur charged
was the case in Korea and later unambiguously became the case in
Vietnam — smacks of being somehow un-American.
But among the various official statements being issued to explain
events in Iraq, any mention of military victory has become notable by
its absence. Tacitly — unnoticed even by the war's critics — the Bush
administration has all but given up any expectation of defeating the
enemy with whom we are engaged.
In the early days of the
insurgency, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez vowed to use "whatever combat
power is necessary to win," displaying all the pugnacity of a George
Patton or Stormin' Norman Schwarzkopf. "That's what America expects of
me," declared Sanchez in December 2003, "and that's what I'm going to
accomplish." Senior commanders no longer make such bold promises. Nor
do senior civilian officials in Washington.
Indeed, today the
Bush administration's aim is not to win but to relieve itself of
responsibility for waging a war that it began but cannot finish. Debate
in national security circles focuses not on deploying war-winning
technologies or fielding innovative tactics that might turn the tide,
but on how we can extricate ourselves before our overstretched forces
suffer irreparable damage.
Optimists are placing their hopes
on a crash program to create a new Iraqi security force that just might
permit us in a year or so to begin reducing the size of our garrison.
Pessimists have their doubts. But virtually no one is predicting we
will be even remotely close to crushing the insurgency. The decisive
victory promised by the war's advocates back in March 2003 — remember
all the talk of "shock and awe"? — has now slipped beyond our grasp.
Of course, following the heady assault on Baghdad, the conflict took an
unexpected turn — precisely as wars throughout history have tended to
do. As a consequence, today a low-tech enemy force estimated at about
10,000 fighters has stymied the mightiest military establishment the
world has ever seen. To be sure, the adversary cannot defeat us
militarily. But neither can we defeat it. In short, U.S. troops today
are no longer fighting to win, but simply to buy time: This has become
the Bush administration's substitute for victory. Worse, in a war such
as in Iraq, time is more likely to work in the other guy's favor.
Whether this reality has yet to fully sink in with the majority of the
American people is unclear. No doubt President Bush hopes the citizenry
will continue to snooze. Better to talk about Social Security reform
and banning gay marriage than to call attention to the unhappy fact
that we are spending several billion dollars per month and losing, on
average, two soldiers per day — not to prevail but simply to prolong
the stalemate. Moreover, if the administration gets its way, we can
expect that expenditure of blood and treasure to continue for many
months, until there emerges an Iraqi government able to fend for itself
or Iraq descends into chaos.
Pending the final judgment of
President Bush's war, this much we can say for sure: Two years after
the dash on Baghdad seemingly affirmed the invincibility of the U.S.
armed forces, the actual limits of American power now lay exposed for
all to see. Our adversaries, real and potential, are no doubt busy
contemplating the implications of those limits.
So too must
we. Our effort to do so should begin with the admission that the idea,
promoted during the heady spring of 2003, that through the aggressive
use of military power the United States might transform the Islamic
world and cement U.S. global preeminence was a dangerous delusion. It
remains a delusion today.
